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Threat Model — Phase 1

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Source: devis.md §20, plus the security-attestation tests pinning each guarantee. Every claim below is enforced in CI — a regression that violates one fails backend/tests/unit/test_security.py.

Trust boundary

GovForge Phase 1 runs entirely on a developer's machine. There is no SaaS component, no remote ingestion, no telemetry. Trust boundary is the local OS user account.

graph TB subgraph Local["Developer machine — trust boundary"] Agent[AI agent — Claude / Codex / ...] MCP[FastMCP server] CLI[gf CLI] API[FastAPI] UI[UI cockpit] Svc[Services] DB[(SQLite)] Agent <-- stdio --> MCP CLI <-- HTTP --> API UI <-- HTTP --> API MCP --> Svc API --> Svc Svc --> DB end Git[(Local Git repo)] Cloud[Cloud / external network] Svc -. read-only .-> Git Local -. blocked — no network egress .- Cloud

Principles (devis §20.1)

  1. No arbitrary shell. GovForge MCP tools never invoke a shell. No subprocess, os.system, popen, asyncio.create_subprocess, no eval / exec.
  2. Git read-only. The Git extractor only calls a documented allowlist of Git verbs. No push, reset, rebase, checkout, commit, merge, gc, prune, clean, add, rm, mv, tag, branch, fetch, pull.
  3. No secrets exfiltration. No outbound network calls in Phase 1. The secret-detection policy reads diff content locally and tags it.
  4. No tracking. No analytics, no phone-home, no "anonymous usage stats".
  5. Local logs only. Every event lands in the SQLite audit log.
  6. Path traversal refused. assert_path_in_repo rejects symlinks that escape the repo root after resolution.

Tool exposure (devis §20.2)

The MCP server in Phase 1 is deliberately small. The forbidden capabilities are not implemented:

Forbidden (Phase 1) Status
Arbitrary shell execution ✗ no subprocess imports, asserted in CI
Arbitrary file writes ✗ tools only mutate .govforge/govforge.db
Arbitrary network access ✗ no httpx/requests calls in the MCP package
Destructive Git ✗ allowlist of read-only verbs, asserted in CI
Data deletion ✗ no service exposes a delete_* operation

The non-destructive surface that is allowed:

  • create tasks
  • create decisions
  • attach git changes (read-only)
  • evaluate policies (writes policy_results rows; no Git side-effect)
  • submit reviews + findings
  • record + resolve disagreements
  • record approvals
  • write to the local .govforge/govforge.db

Concrete test enforcement

Every guarantee above is pinned by a real test. If any of them disappears, the matching test fails and CI blocks the merge.

Guarantee Test
MCP package never imports subprocess / os.system / friends test_mcp_package_does_not_import_subprocess (regex source-grep on the package)
MCP code never calls eval() / exec() test_mcp_tools_do_not_eval_or_exec
Git extractor only uses read-only verbs test_core_git_uses_read_only_verbs_only (allowlist diff/show/log/rev_parse/ls_tree/rev_list/cat_file)
Git extractor doesn't mention destructive verbs test_core_git_has_no_destructive_calls
assert_path_in_repo refuses symlink escape test_assert_path_in_repo_rejects_symlink_escape (real symlink under a real Git repo)
No tool is named run_shell / exec / system / spawn test_no_mcp_tool_named_like_shell (probes the registration surface)

The full test file is at backend/tests/unit/test_security.py.

Data at rest

  • The DB is an ordinary SQLite file at .govforge/govforge.db with WAL journal mode and foreign_keys = ON. No encryption — relies on the containing user account / disk encryption.
  • events.payload_json may contain finding messages, commit hashes, and file paths from the diff. It does not store diff content — just the SHA-256 hash + file list.
  • The policies.toml config is plaintext at .govforge/policies.toml. Treat it like any other dotfile in the repo.

Data in transit

  • MCP transport: stdio (no network).
  • HTTP API: 127.0.0.1:8787 — bound to loopback only, asserted by the default host in govforge.api.server.main. Override with GOVFORGE_API_HOST only if you understand the consequences.
  • UI cockpit: 127.0.0.1:8788 (Next.js dev / next start).

CORS on the API is restricted to localhost:{3000,8788} (declared in backend/src/govforge/api/app.py). Any other origin gets a CORS error; no API call possible from a malicious page in another tab.

Authentication

Phase 1 has no authentication on the local API or the MCP server. The threat model assumes the local user account is the authority. Phase 3 (SaaS) adds OAuth and per-user identity.

Mitigations in Phase 1:

  • API binds to loopback only.
  • The MCP server has no network surface at all (stdio).
  • Project files (.govforge/) inherit the repo's filesystem permissions.

Out of scope for Phase 1

  • Multi-user concurrent access (single-developer assumption).
  • Cross-machine sync / team collaboration.
  • Air-gapped operation hardening (network isolation is enforced by loopback binding only).
  • Supply-chain attestation of the binaries (PyPI wheel + Go binary) — added with the release pipeline in Phase 2.
  • Tamper detection on the SQLite file itself. The audit log is append-only by code convention; an attacker with write access to the DB file can rewrite history. This is acceptable in the "single-developer-laptop" trust boundary.

Reporting issues

Security issues should be reported privately. See SECURITY.md at the project root (created with the public launch).